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The Fate of Arbitration in the Supreme Court:
An Examination
GEORGE Wm. MOSS, III*
The arbitrator looks to what is equitable, the judge to what is law;
and it was for this purpose that arbitration was introduced;
namely, that equity might prevail.
Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. 1, ch. 13
INTRODUCTION
In 1960 the United States Supreme Court proclaimed that an
arbitration proceeding, rather than a judicial tribunal, is the pre-
ferred mechanism for the resolution of labor-management disputes
under collective bargaining agreements. Describing the advantages
of arbitration, the Court emphasized that the labor arbitrator pos-
sessed an expertise foreign to the competence of the courts.' The
parties to arbitration expect his judgment to reflect not merely the
terms of the contract, but other factors such as productivity of a
particular result, its consequence on shop morale, and its ultimate
effect on employer-employee tensions.2
Despite that "pro-arbitration" pronouncement nearly seventeen
years ago, the arbitration process has not always received such fa-
vorable treatment by the Court. This article examines and analyzes
the unsettled relationship between arbitration and judicial interces-
sion, by focusing on two cases decided in the 1975-76 term that most
recently addressed these issues.
BUFFALO FORGE AND SYMPATHY STRIKES
The last few decades witnessed the emergence of two competing
and fundamental principles of national labor policy. First, union-
management disputes are resolved through arbitration.3 Second,
* Associate in the firm of Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Vanderbilt University,
1972; M.B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1974; J.D. (summa cum laude), University of Louisville
School of Law, 1977.
1. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigator Company, 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
See note 16 infra and accompanying text.
2. 363 U.S. at 582. Not only has the Supreme Court praised the arbitration process, but
the Congress has also encouraged arbitration as a forum for the settlement of labor disputes.
See United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970).
3. The emphasis on arbitration as the appropriate vehicle for the settlement of industrial
disputes was articulated in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In
Lincoln Mills, the Court fashioned the beginning of a federal substantive labor law.
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federal courts have the power to intervene in labor disputes, al-
though the power is severely limited.' These two principles were
The Court relied primarily upon the legislative history of section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. §108 (1970) and section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §185(a) (1970). Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia.Act provides:
No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who
has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the
labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle
such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental
machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.
29 U.S.C. §108(a) (1970). Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. §185(a) (1970). The Court in Lincoln Mills stated:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an
agreement not to strike. . . [TIhe legislation does more than confer jurisdiction
in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that
federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organi-
zations. . . [TIhe entire tenor of the [legislative] history indicates that the agree-
ment to arbitrate grievance disputes was considered as quid pro quo of a no-strike
agreement.
353 U.S. at 455.
4. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §104 (1970), severely limits the use
of the injunction:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any em-
ployer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described
in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or inter-
ested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or
other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit
in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts hereto-
fore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore
specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence
the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is
described in section 103 of this title.
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accommodated in 1970 when the Supreme Court in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770 held that federal district
courts may enjoin strikes arising over disputes which are subject to
grievance and arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. Six years later, in Buffalo Forge v. United SteelworkersI
the Court held that, notwithstanding the existence of a no-strike
clause and a mandatory arbitration procedure, section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 19341 prohibited a district court from issu-
ing an injunction to halt a sympathy strike.' A brief historical back-
ground is necessary to understand Buffalo Forge's treatment of the
conflicting policies behind section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
Section 301 Injunctions Before Buffalo Forge
Widespread federal intervention in industrial disputes through
the use of the injunction motivated passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in 1932. Section 4 of the Act 9 proscribes the use of the injunction
by federal district courts when workers are involved in labor dis-
putes. In 1947, Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA) including section 30110 which confers jurisdiction on
federal district courts in any law suit that arises out of labor con-
tract violations. Although this Act ostensibly was jurisdictional in
nature without any provision for federal substantive labor law, 1 at
the time of its enactment some thought section 301 did more than
simply confer jurisdiction. The Supreme Court initially interpreted
section 301 to be jurisdictional only 2 but later reversed itself in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills. 13
In Lincoln Mills, a collective bargaining agreement contained a
grievance-arbitration provision and a no-strike clause. When the
employer refused to arbitrate a dispute, the union initiated an ac-
tion in federal district court. The district court ordered arbitration
but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. On appeal,
5. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
6. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
7. See note 4 supra.
8. 428 U.S. 397.
9. See note 4 supra.
10. See note 2 supra.
11. Wimberly, The Labor Injunction-Past, Present, and Future, 22 S. CAR. L. REv. 689,
728 (1970). See also Note, Labor Injunction and Judge-Made Law: The Contemporary Role
of Norris-La Guardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70 (1960).
12. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955).
13. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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the Supreme Court held that section 301 implicitly authorized fed-
eral district courts to create a body of federal substantive labor
law." In addition, the Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did
not prevent federal courts from ordering specific performance of
provisions in collective bargaining agreements. 5 Accordingly, the
Court ordered the employer to arbitrate.
The Steelworkers Trilogy" cases represent the next significant
development of federal substantive labor law. In these cases, de-
cided only a few years after Lincoln Mills, the Court emphasized
that arbitration is the preferred method for peaceful settlement of
labor-management disputes arising out of collective bargaining
agreements. The Court declared that the union's consideration for
the arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement is the
no-strike clause. The Supreme Court further held that district
courts can require arbitration and can also enforce the award of an
arbitrator. 7
Following Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy, the issue
arose whether federal district courts, notwithstanding section 4 of
Norris-LaGuardia, could enforce the other side of the quid pro quo,
i.e., the no-strike clause. The Supreme Court in Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson" concluded that a district court may not issue an
injunction to restrain a strike over a grievance despite the existence
of a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement."
In Sinclair, the Court reasoned that a "labor dispute" was in-
volved within the terms of section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Therefore, the district court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunc-
tion unless section 301 of the LMRA could be considered to have
narrowed the scope of Norris-LaGuardia. 0 The Court concluded
that the legislative history of section 301 demonstrated no intent to
14. Id. at 451.
15. Id. at 458. See note 3 supra.
16. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
17. Id. The importance of arbitration as the device for resolution of labor-management
disputes is emphasized in D. Box & H. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 220-21
(1970), where it is reported that nearly 95% of all collective bargaining agreements contain
arbitration provisions.
18. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
19. Id. at 199-210. "Following Sinclair, employers initiated their actions in state courts.
The unions parlay was to remove the actions to federal district court. In Avco Corp. v. Lodge
735, IAM, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld the right of removal." 390 U.S. at
560.
20. In dissent Justice Brennan stated that the district court should be able to issue an
injunction, but only after a careful examination of the dispute's arbitrability. 370 U.S. at 228.
[Vol. 9
Fate of Arbitration
limit the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Thus, the Supreme
Court in Sinclair effectively removed an important remedy from the
arsenal of section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act."
This limitation was, however, short lived.
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770,11 a Cali-
fornia supermarket chain and a local union were parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement which provided that contractual inter-
pretation or application controversies should be resolved by a griev-
ance procedure including arbitration. The contract also contained
a clause proscribing unauthorized work stoppage, lockouts, picket-
ing and boycotting. A dispute arose over the performance of work
by non-bargaining unit employees. Subsequently, a strike ensued
and the mandatory arbitration clause was invoked.
The Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act had to be accomo-
dated with section 301 of the LMRA in order to achieve industrial
peace and expeditious settlement of labor disputes." To achieve
these goals, the Court reshaped its national labor policy to allow for
more liberal use of the injunction. The Court overruled Sinclair,25
holding that the Norris-LaGuardia policies against issuance of in-
junctions must be balanced with the endorsement of arbitration.6
Thus, by sanctioning reliance on the injunction, the Court indirectly
encouraged the settlement of disputes by arbitration because par-
ties to the labor agreement felt constrained to arbitrate.
Regarding the right of the district court to issue an injunction, the
Court stated:
[Tihe unavailability of equitable relief in the arbitration context
presents a serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring
the voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful reso-
lution of labor disputes, that the core purpose of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is not sacrificed by the limited use of equitable
remedies to further this important policy, and consequently that
21. Id. at 199-203.
22. Id
23. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). For an excellent discussion of Boys Markets, see Vladeck, Boys
Markets and National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REv. 93 (1970).
24. See Note, Labor Injunctions: A Look at the Boys Markets Case, 5 U. SAN FRAN. L.
REV. 516 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Labor Injunctions].
25. The Court's decision in Sinclair was supported in part, because section 301 of LMRA
did not explicitly repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act and no other legislation in the Norris-
LaGuardia era expressly stated that the anti-injunction provisions of the statute were inoper-
ative.
26. For an analysis of the statutory interpretation employed in Boys Markets, see Labor
Injunctions, supra note 24, at 525-26.
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar the granting of injunctive
relief in the circumstances of the instant case.27
However, in holding that the district court could issue an injunc-
tion, the Court limited its decision to situations in which the bar-
gaining agreement contained a mandatory grievance adjustment
and arbitration procedure:
Nor does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is
appropriate as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an
arbitrable grievance. . . .When a strike is sought to be enjoined
because it is over a grievance which both parties are contractually
bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive
order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and
the employer should be ordered to arbitrate as a condition of his
obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the Dis-
trict Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunc-
tion would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity .... "I
While the Court did not specifically mandate a presumption of
arbitrability in the injunction decision-making process, it did re-
quire a careful scrutiny of arbitrability. Thus, the Court strayed
from it's language in the Steelworkers Trilogy cases which estab-
lished a "presumption of arbitrability" for labor disputes .2
The Boys Markets holding was reinforced in Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW,30 where an injunction was deemed proper notwithstanding
the absence of a contractual no-strike provision. The contract in
Gateway did have an arbitration provision. The Court indicated
that the obligation to arbitrate imposed by a collective bargaining
agreement gave rise to an implied no-strike duty that supports the
issuance of an injunction against a work stoppage. The Court rea-
soned that "[albsent an explicit expression of such an intention,
however, the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike
should be construed as having coterminous application." '3'
Contrary to the language used in Boys Markets, in Gateway the
Court expressly reinforced its support of a "presumption of arbitra-
bility" when it announced that the Steelworkers Trilogy presump-
tion should be applied. 32
27. 398 U.S. at 253.
28. Id. at 253-54 (emphasis added). This language is an adoption of Mr. Justice Brennan's
dissent in Sinclair. See note 20 supra.
29. 363 U.S. at 582-83.
30. 414 U.S. 368 (1973).
31. Id. at 382.
32. Id. at 379-80. For a discussion of the Gateway decision, see Oppenheim, Gateway &
Alexander- Whither Arbitration? 48 TusL. L. REv. 973 (1974).
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Buffalo Forge: Recasting the Parties
The propriety of the sympathy strike was extensively litigated in
the courts and before the National Labor Relations Board following
the Boys Markets decision. In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers"3 the Supreme Court considered for the first time
whether a federal court could "enjoin a sympathy strike pending the
arbitrator's decision as to whether the strike is forbidden by the
express no-strike clause contained in the collective bargaining con-
tract to which the striking union is a party."34
The employer in Buffalo Forge operated several plant and office
facilities in the Buffalo and New York City communities. At Buffalo
Forge, production and maintenance employees (P&M) were repre-
sented by the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO and its
local unions.3" The locals and the employer were parties to two sepa-
rate collective bargaining agreements.
Two provisions in the agreements kindled the dispute in Buffalo
Forge. First, the contracts contained a no-strike clause, 6 and sec-
ond, the collective bargaining agreements contained grievance and
arbitration procedures for settling disputes over the interpretation
and application of each contract. These latter procedures provided
that should differences arise concerning application of the agree-
ment, "an earnest effort" must be made to settle the dispute
through arbitration and without the suspension of work. 7
33. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). For a discussion of sympathy strikes see Connolly & Connolly,
Employers' Rights Relative to Sympathy Strikes, 14 DUQ. L.REv. 121 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Connolly & Connolly].
34. Id. at 399.
35. Local No. 1874 and Local No. 3732.
36. Collective Bargaining Agreement § 14(b) (1971):
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of work. No
Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, instigate, aid or condone
any such activities. No employee shall participate in any such activity. The Union
recognizes its possible liabilities for violation of this provision and will use its
influence to see that work stoppages are prevented. Unsuccessful efforts by Union
officers or Union representatives to prevent and terminate conduct prohibited by
this paragraph, will not be construed as 'aid' or 'condonation' of such conduct and
shall not result in any disciplinary actions against the Officers, committeemen or
stewards involved.
See 428 U.S. at 399 n.1.
37. Collective Bargaining Agreement § 26 (1971):
Should differences arise between the [employer] and any employee covered by this
Agreement as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement,
or should any trouble of any kind arise in the plant, there shall be no suspension of
work on account of such differences, but an earnest effort shall be made to settle
such differences immediately under the six-step grievance and arbitration proce-
dure provided in sections 27 through 32.
See 428 U.S. at 400.
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Immediately before the dispute in Buffalo Forge arose, the United
Steelworkers along with two other local unions were certified to
represent the company's clerical and technical (O&T) office em-
ployees. After unsuccessful negotiations to reach their first collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the O&T employees struck and set up
picket lines at every company plant and office. Shortly thereafter,
the P&M employees honored the O&T picket lines and stopped
work in support of their sister unions respecting the O&T employ-
ees.
The employer initiated an action in federal district court under
section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act seeking an
order for arbitration, damages and injunctive relief. First, the em-
ployer alleged that the work stoppage contravened the no-strike
clause. 38 Second, the employer argued that if the no-strike clause
was not violated, then the strike was caused by a specific incident
involving P&M truck drivers' refusal to follow a supervisor's instruc-
tions to cross the O&T picket line. Therefore, the employer argued
that the issue whether the P&M employees' work stoppage violated
the no-strike clause was arbitrable under the grievance and arbitra-
tion contractual provision for settling disputes over the interpreta-
tion and application of each contract.39
The District Court for the Western District of New York con-
cluded that the work stoppage was the result of the P&M employees
engaging in a sympathy strike solely out of deference to a lawful
picket line established by a sister union. Accordingly, the district
court held that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited it
from issuing an injunction because the sympathy strike by the P&M
employees was not over an "arbitrable grievance" and hence not
within the "narrow" exception to Norris-LaGuardia established in
Boys Markets.40 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals4' and the Su-
preme Court42 of the United States affirmed the decision of the
district court.
Buffalo Forge In The Supreme Court-Blossom Arbitration?
The Supreme Court began its consideration of whether a sympa-
thy strike may be enjoined by noting that federal courts have taken
38. See note 35 supra.
39. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
40. 386 F. Supp. 405 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
41. 517 F.2d 1207, 1210 (2nd Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit adopted the reasoning of the
district court.
42. 428 U.S. at 397.
376 [Vol. 9
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diverse views on the issue. 3 One line of appellate decisions held that
a sympathy strike was not enjoinable because the strike is not "over
a grievance." 4 Another line of cases took the position that Boys
Markets permits the use of the injunction to halt sympathy strikes
in deference to another's line. 5 The Court further recognized the
43. Id. at 404.
44. The Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied the same rationale as the
Second Circuit in Buffalo Forge. In Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972), some company refineries had collective bargaining
agreements with the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and with the Meat
Cutters similar to the contract in Buffalo Forge. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
The Meat Cutters and ILA agreements had different expiration dates. When the longshore-
men's contract expired they struck and established picket lines. The presence of these picket
lines caused a work stoppage by the Meat Cutters. Following the work stoppage, the company
sought injunctive relief. After the district court had granted the injunction, 337 F. Supp. 810
(E.D.La. 1972), the Fifth Circuit reversed, reading Boys Markets to require a finding that
the strike was precipitated by a grievance against the company. The court concluded that
the injunction was not a proper remedy because the strike was not caused by another union's
picket line. See also Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union #53, 520
F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976), where the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of an injunction against unions to cross lawful pickets established
by a sister union. Injunctive relief was not granted because the court of appeals viewed the
failure to cross the picket line as a "dispute which [resulted] from a work stoppage" rather
than a Boys Markets work stoppage which was the result of a labor dispute. 520 F.2d at 1221.
These two courts viewed Boys Markets as having two requirements: (a) a dispute subject
to the contract's grievance procedure; (b) a work stoppage caused by the dispute. See Con-
nolly & Connolly, supra note 33, at 130. See also United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, 519 F.2d 1236 (1975), reh. denied, 526 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 428 U.S.
910 (1976); General Cable Corp. v. IBEW Local 1644, 331 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1971);
Ourisman Chevrolet Co. v. Automotive Lodge 1486, 77 L.R.R.M. 2084 (D.D.C. 1971); Stroeh-
mann Bros. Co. v. Confectionery Workers Local 427, 315 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Pa. 1970);
Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Local 2208, IBEW, 314 F. Supp. 885 (D.N.H. 1970).
45. The Third, Fourth and Eighth Circuits adopted the position that an injunction is
proper. For instance, in Monongehala Power Co. v. Local 2332 IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir.
1973), employees of one union went on strike and set up picket lines. Fellow employees, who
were represented by a sister union, refused to cross the picket line. The collective bargaining
agreement contained a no-strike provision and broad grievance and arbitration provisions.
The court held that the "dispute as to whether the refusal to cross the picket line and
resulting work stoppage violated Article X [no-strike clause] was clearly subject to manda-
tory adjustment .. " Id. at 1214. See also NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauf-
feurs, Local Union No. 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); Island
Creek Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 507 F.2d 650 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877
(1975); Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Wilmington Shipping
Co. v. International Longshoremen's Assn., 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1022 (1974); Valmac Industries v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 428 U.S. 906 (1976); Associated General Contractors v. International
Union of Operating Engineers, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted an intermediate position. In Hyster Co. v.
Independent Towing Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975), the court held that work stoppage
which resulted from refusal of the union and their members to cross a stranger picket line
did not give rise to an arbitrable issue under the collective bargaining agreement. The court
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division of opinion between appellate courts on the issues of whether
a sympathy strike should be enjoined pending arbitration and
whether the strike was permissible under the no-strike clause. The
Court then reviewed the Boys Markets decision in which it held that
a union could be enjoined from striking over a dispute which it was
bound to arbitrate.4 6
The Court emphasized that the holding in Boys Markets was a
"narrow one" restricted to situations where the collective bargain-
ing contract contained mandatory grievance and arbitration proce-
dures.47 Moreover, the Court held that under Boys Markets a district
court may not issue an injunction until it first holds that a dispute
exists which is over "a grievance which both parties are bound to
arbitrate."48
Relying on this non-expansive language, the Court indicated that
Boys Markets was not controlling. The Court believed that the sym-
pathy strike did not ensue from any management-union dispute
that was subject to the arbitration provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Rather, the work stoppage was a sympathy
strike honoring the picket line of a sister union.49
The Court further found that an injunction was "not authorized
solely because of the company's allegation that the sympathy strike
violated the express no-strike provision of the contract. As justifica-
tion for it's conclusion, the Court summarily announced that it had
never suggested that district courts have the power to enjoin actual
or threatened contract violations notwithstanding the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.'" Support for its conclusion was found by looking to
Congress' refusal to lift the Norris-LaGuardia ban against labor-
dispute injunctions.5'
The Court next focused on the grievance and arbitration provi-
sions for the settlement of disputes over the interpretation and ap-
plication of the no-strike clause. In Buffalo Forge, the parties disa-
greed as to whether the sympathy strike violated the union's no-
strike provision. The Court sided with the employer in determining
that the issue was arbitrable. However, the Court said
stated that because there was no "waiver of any collective bargaining right" and because the
dispute was not arbitrable, a Boys Markets injunction was not proper. But see Inland Steel
Co. v. Local Union No. 1545, United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974).
46. 398 U.S. 235.
47. 428 U.S. at 406, citing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S.
at 253.
48. Id. at 407, citing Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. at 254.
49. Id. at 409.
50. Id.
51. 370 U.S. at 205-08.
[Vol. 9
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...it does not follow that the District Court was empowered not
only to order arbitration but to enjoin the strike pending the deci-
sion of the arbitrator, despite the express prohibition of § 4(a) of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act against injunctions prohibiting any per-
son from "[c]easing or refusing to perform any work or to remain
in any relation of employment." 52
The Court reached this conclusion because it foresaw possible
abuses of the injunction that might result after an employer's alle-
gation of a breach of contract. The majority believed it would be
improper for federal courts to become involved in intensive fact-
finding missions in order to interpret collective bargaining agree-
ments. Such involvement would undermine its pro-arbitration pol-
icy and cut deeply into the Norris-LaGuardia Act, thus making
district courts ". . . potential participants in a wide range of arki-
trable disputes . . .not just for the purpose of enforcing promises
to arbitrate, which was the limit of Boys Markets, but for the pur-
pose of preliminary dealing with the merits of factual and legal
issues that are subject for the arbitrator."53 Furthermore, it was sug-
gested that the arbitrators would be unduly influenced or preju-
diced were district courts to undertake the initial fact-finding and
then determine that the conduct was a clear violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The Court also indicated that temporary
injunctions tend to permanently settle the issue. Finally, the time
and expense of re-litigation before an arbitrator would discourage
the losing party in the district court from initiating arbitration pro-
ceedings. In denying the district court the power to use the injunc-
tion, the Court apparently reasoned that the issuance of an injunc-
tion would have an adverse affect on the arbitration process.
The dissent perceived the issue differently. For them the question
was not whether a federal court could enjoin a sympathy strike, but
rather, whether the union's quid pro quo for the employer's under-
taking to arbitrate, i. e., a contractual obligation not to strike, is
severable into two parts-one part which the court is permitted to
enforce by injunction and another which it may not. 4 The only part
52. 428 U.S. at 410.
53. Id. at 410-11. The Court noted that
in 1972, the most recent year for which comprehensive data have been published,
more than 21,000,000 workers in the United States were covered under more than
150,000 collective bargaining agreements. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of
National Unions and Employee Assns. 87-88 (1973).
Id. at 411 n.12. The dissent stated, however, that these figures do not shed light on the
number of sympathy strikes which might violate no-strike provisions. Only 12 cases were
heard in recent years. 428 U.S. at 414 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. 428 U.S. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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which was enforceable according to the majority, the dissent sug-
gested, was the part relating to a strike "over an arbitrable griev-
ance." The dissent observed a two-tiered foundation for the Court's
holding: (1) a literal interpretation of Norris-LaGuardia; and (2) a
fear that the federal courts would make a massive entry into con-
tract interpretation-a field reserved for arbitrators. The dissent
contended that the first major rationale of the majority had been
rejected in cases where the central concerns of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act were not implicated. They also argued that the "massive entry"
rationale was unrealistic 55 and that it had been rejected in Gateway
Coal when the Court held "'a substantial question of contractual
interpretation' was a sufficient basis for federal equity jurisdic-
tion." 51
Like the majority, the dissent looked to Boys Markets as support
for the use of the injunction. First, they discussed the underlying
purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The dissent pointed out that
it was the history of injunctions against strike activity in further-
ance of "union organization, recognition and collective bargaining"
and not court negotiation and enforcement of contracts that
prompted the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 ,
Second, it was emphasized that section 301 of the LMRA, passed
twelve years after Norris-LaGuardia, expanded the scope of federal
jurisdiction in dealing with a violation of labor-management con-
tracts. The dissent reviewed the quid pro quo argument, i.e., a no-
strike provision in return for an undertaking to arbitrate, and disa-
greed with the Court that the strike did not deprive the employer
55. See note 52 supra.
56. 428 U.S. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 416. To lend support to this conclusion the dissent referred to the following
statement by the neutral members of the Special Atkinson-Sinclair Committee of the A.B.A.
Labor Relations Law Section which was quoted in Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 253 n.22.:
Any proposal which would subject unions to injunctive relief must take account of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the opposition expressed in that Act to the issuing
of injunctions in labor disputes. Nevertheless, the reasons behind the Norris-
LaGuardia Act seem scarcely applicable to the situation .. .[in which a strike in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement is enjoined]. The Act was passed
primarily because of widespread dissatisfaction with the tendency of judges to
enjoin concerted activities in accordance with "doctrines of tort law which made
the lawfulness of a strike depend upon judicial views of social and economic policy."
[citation omitted]. Where an injunction is used against a strike in breach of
contract, the union is not subjected in this fashion to judicially created limitations
on its freedom of action but is simply compelled to comply with limitations to which
it has previously agreed. Moreover, where the underlying dispute is arbitrable, the
union is not deprived of any practicable means of pressing its claim but is only
required to submit the dispute to the impartial tribunal that it has agreed to
establish for this purpose.
428 U.S. at 416 n.7.
[Vol. 9
Fate of Arbitration
of the bargain. 8 Third, the dissent examined the Norris-LaGuardia
Act59 and concluded that its literal wording was not an "insuperable
obstacle to specific endorsement of a no-strike commitment in ac-
cordance with 'the usual processes of law."'' 0 They noted that sev-
eral decisions previously held that the courts could use the injunc-
tion in labor disputes to fulfill obligations under the Railway Labor
Act."' Finally, the dissenting justices reasoned that the policy which
favors arbitration also favors the making of enforceable agreements
to arbitrate. If a no-strike clause is not enforceable against a sympa-
thy strike, it will discourage employers from agreeing to binding
arbitration because union assurance against work stoppages would
be tainted. In addition, the dissent reviewed the LMRA's legislative
history which was discussed in the Lincoln Mills case.62 The stat-
ute's legislative history supported the use of the injunction to com-
pel parties to honor the collective bargaining agreement. 3
In an extensive consideration of the importance of arbitration, the
dissent stated that the net effect of the arbitration process is to
remove completely any ambiguity in the agreement as it applies
to an unforeseen, or undescribed, set of facts. But if the specific
situation is foreseen and described in the contract itself with such
precision that there is no need for interpretation by an arbitrator,
it would be reasonable to give the same legal effect to such an
agreement prior to the arbitrator's decision.64
In summation, it was asserted that injunctions against sympathy
strikes should be permissible where the action is clearly a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement.
58. Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
60. 428 U.S. at 422 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. 45 U.S.C. §§151-88 (1936). Under the Railway Labor Act, if the parties to a labor
agreement referred the case to arbitration the arbitration award was enforceable in federal
district court. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago, R. & I.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30,
39-42 (1957), the Supreme Court held that a federal court could enjoin a strike by a railroad
union over a dispute subject to mandatory arbitration under the Railway Labor Act. The
Court suggested that the Norris-LaGuardia policy of non-intervention in the federal courts
should yield to the promotion of an effective arbitration process. See also Virginian Ry. Co.
v. System Federation No. 40, Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). Accord, Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952), Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 237-40 (1949).
62. See note 3 supra.
63. 428 U.S. at 419-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also suggested that the
purpose of § 301(a) of the LMRA was to create an additional forum for the enforcement of
contracts.
64. 428 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Non-Removal Clauses
Employers who believe the quid pro quo is vitiated because their
right to enjoin a sympathy strike in federal court is limited may, as
the dissent in Buffalo Forge suggested, be reluctant to enter into
collective bargaining agreements which have a mandatory arbitra-
tion clause. Should this prediction come true, the very foundation
of the nation's pro-arbitration policy may be weakened.
One alternative currently being implemented by management is
the inclusion of a non-removal clause in collective bargaining agree-
ments. 5 By including such a provision in the contract, the employer
effectively maintains the action in state court free from the threat
of removal to federal district court. Thus, the decision is Buffalo
Forge is avoided. No court has yet confronted the question of
whether a non-removal clause in a collective bargaining agreement
frustrates public policy. Arguably, a non-removal clause might be
ignored if a court reaches such a conclusion."
While the non-removal clause may appear to be an attractive
solution, it must be carefully scrutinized and analyzed before each
individual employer interjects the issue of non-removal into the
negotiation process.. Upon close examination, the non-removal
clause fails to satisfy even the most rudimentary test of pract-icality.
First, state courts generally are not as conversant with labor law
issues as are the federal courts. Thus, they are not as well equipped
to decide the complex issues inherent in labor law. 7 Second, the
bargaining for a non-removal clause may insert an unnecessary issue
into contract negotiations when there are more important matters
that should be receiving the employer's attention. Finally, and per-
haps most significant, the negotiation for a non-removal clause may
in some instances tend to frustrate the achievement of the goal of
our national labor policy-an equitable, peaceful accommodation of
competing social and political interests of the employer and the
65. In Eckel v. Shell Eastern Petroleum Products, 167 A. 869 (Ch. N.J. 1933), a lower New
Jersey court indicated that "[w]aiver of right of removal may be . . . by express agree-
ment .. " Id. at 871.
66. See Hoh v. Pepsico, Inc., 491 F.2d 556 (2nd Cir. 1974), where there was a provision in
the collective bargaining contract that neither the union nor management would seek re-
moval. Here, the Court held that where the union's petition was to compel submission to
arbitration, removal was proper notwithstanding the non-removal clause.
67. Parenthetically, a non-removal clause may backfire on an employer who finds himself
in a state court in a rural community where the judge is a sympathetic "cousin to the
employee." An employer may be better off were he to risk unfavorable disposition in federal
court where he at least knows he will receive an impartial hearing on the merits of his case.
Interview with Carl Warns, Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law and
Member of the National Academy of Arbitrators, October 11, 1976.
[Vol. 9
Fate of Arbitration
employees. Negotiation for a non-removal clause might be viewed
by employees with suspicion. Employers might obtain the same
result if they follow the normal channels of arbitration and seek
a cease and desist order. Such an order by the arbitrator does not
usually generate the amount of emotion that normally ensues when
an injunction is issued.
The ultimate question, therefore, is whether arbitration is the
most expeditious, effective vehicle to settle a labor dispute. If it is,
then an employer who attempts to circumvent the jurisdiction of
federal courts by negotiating for a non-removal clause may be fos-
tering an unnecessary confrontation rather than striving for an equi-
table accommodation.
HINES V. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT: FAIR REPRESENTATION AND
ARBITRAL FINALITY
The two rudimentary principles of our national labor policy that
were accommodated in Buffalo Forge, i.e., the resolution of labor
disputes via arbitration and the intervention by federal courts in
labor relations' conflicts, were also weighed in Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc."8 In Anchor Motor Freight the Supreme Court
held that a provision of the collective bargaining agreement which
provided for finality of grievance-arbitration decisions with respect
to the employer was without effect when the union did not fairly
represent the grievant-employee. An understanding of the Court's
treatment of fair representation cases prior to Anchor Motor Freight
is helpful to evaluating the scope of this latter decision.
Finality and Fair Representation: From Steele to Vaca
1. Arbitration decisions are final and binding
A fundamental reason for the smooth functioning of the
grievance-arbitration process is the fact that arbitration awards are
generally considered "final and binding." Only in extreme instances
will the decisions of arbitrators be upset. The Steelworkers Trilogy
cases 9 indicated that "it is the arbitrator's construction [of the
collective bargaining agreement] which was bargained for; and.
the courts have no business overruling him. .. .",
Congress approved the concept of arbitral finality with the enact-
ment of the Labor Management Relations Act:
68. 424 U.S. 544 (1976).
69. See note 16 supra.
70. 363 U.S. at 599.
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Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is de-
clared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance dis-
putes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective bargaining agreement .... 11 -
Thus, the underlying premise of the arbitral process is that the
arbitrator's decision will be the final" solution to a labor dispute. If
a party in an arbitration proceeding is not satisfied with the out-
come and asks a judicial tribunal to reverse the arbitrator's award,
he challenges that fundamental premise."
71. 29 U.S.C. §173(d) (1970).
72. For an analysis of arbitral finality see Note, Judicial Deference to Arbitral Determina-
tions: Continuing Problems of Power and Finality, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 936 (1976). See also
Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control
of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. Rgv. 1435 (1963); Ford v. General Elec. Co.
395 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1968); Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (5th
Cir. 1966).
73. There are situations in which the assertion of arbitral finality will not preclude judicial
review. If there has been fraud, corruption or partiality in the arbitration process, the arbitra-
tor's award may be reviewed. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). If the arbitrator has exceeded his power (if the award violates public
policy or was based on factual error), the award will not be enforced. See, e.g., Black v. Cutter
Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). See
also Torrington v. Metal Workers Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2nd Cir. 1966). In Torrington,
the Second Circuit observed that "the mandate that the arbitrator stay within the confines
of the collective bargaining agreement . . . requires a reviewing court to pass upon whether
the agreement authorizes the arbitrator to expand its express terms on the basis of the parties'
prior practice." Id. at 680. For a discussion of the limitations of an arbitrator's power to
modify a collective bargaining agreement see Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HARv. L. Rav. 1490-98 (1959).
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), where the Court indicated that review of an error
was limited solely to determining whether the parties had agreed to let the arbitrator decide
the issue, several circuit courts have set their own standard for review of an arbitrator's award
which was based on error. The First Circuit court overturned an arbitrator's decision when
"the central fact underlying . .. [the] decision [was] concededly erroneous." Electronics
Corp. of America v. Electrical Workers Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1974). The Fifth
Circuit would overturn an arbitrator's award when "the reasoning... is so palpably faulty
that no judge, or group of judges, could ever conceivably have made such a ruling." Safeway
Stores v. American Bakery Workers, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968). In 1968 the
Third Circuit followed the Supreme Court mandate more closely:
If the court is convinced both that the contract procedure was intended to cover
the dispute and, in addition, that the intended procedure was adequate to provide
a fair and informed decision, then review of the merits of any decision should be
limited to cases of fraud, deceit, or instances of unions in breach of their duty of
fair representation.
Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32, 38 (3rd Cir. 1968). However, less than
a year later the Third Circuit abandoned their position in Bieski and opened up review on
the rubric of error if the interpretation of the arbitrator was "unsupported by principles of
contract construction." Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128. (3rd Cir.
1969).
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2. Fair representation since World War II
In Steele v. Louisville R.R. Co., 74 a white employee's union, the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers, was recognized
as the exclusive bargaining representative for a craft of firemen
employed by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. The union
amended its existing collective bargaining agreement to exclude
black employees from jobs. The petitioner, a black fireman, de-
manded representation. His demand was based on the status of the
union as the exclusive representative of the whole craft.
The Supreme Court indicated that certain inequities may result
in the terms and benefits obtained for various employees because
of the type of job classifications and seniority provisions. However,
the Court labeled race-based discrimination "invidious." The Court
stated that a union was obligated to "represent non-union or minor-
ity union members without . . . hostile discrimination, fairly, im-
partially, and in good faith."75 Thus, the Court effectively imposed
a duty on unions to fairly represent the interests of all employees in
a bargaining unit regardless of whether they were union or non-
union.
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman7" extended the Steele doctrine beyond
racial discrimination. In Huffman the Supreme Court confronted a
collective bargaining agreement clause whereby an employee re-
ceived seniority credit for pre-employment military service. The
Court believed that the Union had not exceeded its discretion in
representing employees. The Court did state, however, that the
Steele doctrine extended to any type of discrimination which vio-
lated the union's duty of "complete loyalty to . the interests of
all whom it represents."77
In 1964, the Supreme Court in Humphrey v. Moore,"5 considered
the question of whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a contract
violation suit involving fair representation together with unfair
labor practice issues. In Humphrey, the employees of two companies
were represented by the same union. The Supreme Court found that
the decision of a joint union-employer committee upholding the
74. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
75. Id. at 204. Steele was decided under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151(a), 152
(1970). Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) and the RLA
grant representatives designated by the majority of the employees of an appropriate bargain-
ing unit (craft in the RLA) the authority to serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for all
employees.
76. 345 U.S, 330 (1953).
77. Id. at 338.
78. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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consolidation of seniority rosters was made in good faith and posed
an equitable solution to the problem of a merger absorption. The
Court also held that the joint committee's decision, pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement, was final and binding on the par-
ties. Such a decision must stand unless the court found: (1) that it
lacked jurisdiction; (2) "fraud or breach of duty" by the union; or
(3) that the employees did not receive a fair hearing."9 Thus, the
Court asserted its jurisdiction to hear both the fair representation
and unfair labor practices issues.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court considered the case of Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox,4 wherein an employee had not used the
grievance procedure before resorting to court action. The Maddox
Court held that an employee could not bypass grievance procedures
in the collective bargaining agreement by bringing an independent
suit against the employer. It was necessary to first exhaust the griev-
ance procedures. However, the Court commented that an employee
did not have to utilize the grievance mechanism where "the union
refuses to press or only perfunctorily presses the [employee's]
claim.""'
Vaca v. Sipes82 is the culmination of the Supreme Court cases
dealing with fair representation. In Vaca, an employee (Owens)
brought suit in the Missouri courts against Local 12 of the National
Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers. Owens was allegedly dis-
charged for bad health, and he sought a grievance against the em-
ployer. Instead of immediately proceeding to arbitration, the union
commissioned a new physician to examine him. When the medical
examination did not support Owens' claim that the company had
improperly discharged him, the union refused to pursue the griev-
ance any further. Owens alleged in his suit that the union had
"arbitrarily, capriciously and without just or reasonable cause" re-
fused to invoke arbitration.
The Court held that before a wrongfully discharged employee can
bring an action directly against his employer he must prove that the
union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation
in handling his grievance.8 3 However, the Court further held that the
union in Vaca did not necessarily breach its duty of fair representa-
tion just because it "settled the grievance short of arbitration." 4 It
79. Id. at 351.
80. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
81. Id. at 652.
82. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
83. Id. at 186.
84. Id. at 192.
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proclaimed that a union does not breach its duty of fair representa-
tion when it decides "in good faith and in a non-arbitrary manner""
that an employee's grievance lacks merit. The Court concluded that
because the union did not act in bad faith nor demonstrate any
hostility there was no breach of the duty of fair representation.A6
In Vaca, however, the Court did not elaborate on the kinds of
conduct which would constitute a breach of fair representation.
Consequently, confusion resulted in the lower courts regarding the
meaning of a breach of the duty of fair representation. Moreover,
Vaca and its predecessors raised the question of whether an em-
ployee whose grievance was denied in the arbitration process could
subsequently retry the grievance in a judicial tribunal by alleging
breach of contract against the employer and breach of the duty of
fair representation against the union. A similar issue arose as to how
the duty of fair representation could be reconciled with the long
standing principle of arbitral finality.
Anchor Motor Freight: The Fate of Arbitral Finality
1. Background
Anchor Motor Freight involved the claims of eight truck drivers
employed by Anchor Motor Freight who were discharged for alleged
dishonesty. The employment relationship between the employees
and Anchor was governed by a collective bargaining agreement
which prohibited discharges without just cause. 7
Anchor had a practice of reimbursing its drivers for travel expen-
ses, including lodging, incurred when the drivers were out of town.
On May 31, 1967 the company learned that some of its drivers were
reporting expenses for reimbursement in amounts in excess of the
expenses actually incurred. The company conducted an extensive
85. Id. at 194.
86. Following Vaca the Supreme Court held that Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650 (1964) was not applicable in a suit for wages by a seaman in federal court and allowed
the seaman to choose arbitration or court action.
For three differing views of representation compare Summers, Individual Rights in Collec-
tive Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962), with Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 H~Av. L. REv. 601 (1956) [and] Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Criti-
cal Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RuroMas L.
REv. 631 (1959).
87. For a discussion on the confusion which was precipitated by Vaca, see Lehmann, The
Union's Duty of Fair Representation-Steele and Its Successors, 30 FED. B.J. 280, 283-85
(1971); Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: A Survey of the Contemporary Framework and
a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SuFFoLK L. REv. 1096 (1974); Tobias,
A Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by his Union, 41 U. CINN. L. REv.
55 (1972); Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the
Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 TOLEDO L. REv. 514 (1974).
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investigation. At a subsequent meeting between the company and
the union, the company produced motel receipts previously submit-
ted by the eight drivers. All of the receipts were in excess of the
charges listed on the motel's registration cards. The company also
presented a notarized statement of the motel clerk and an affidavit
of the motel owner verifying the accuracy of the registration cards.
Notwithstanding the evidence which was presented by the com-
pany, the union opposed the discharges. The meeting between the
company and the union culminated in an agreement that the drivers
would be reinstated pending the submission of the dispute to the
Joint Arbitration Committee which was scheduled for late July.
When the employees asked the union to investigate the motel, the
union advised the employees that "they had nothing to worry about
. ..that there was no way the company could fire them . . .that
there was no need to investigate or do anything.""8 The union as-
sured the employees that they would handle the defense.
In the period between the first company-union meeting and con-
vening of the Joint Arbitration Committee, the union conducted no
investigation, gathered no evidence, and did not advise the drivers
of their procedural rights. The union's only preparation was to in-
form the petitioners to attend the meeting and present their case.
At the Joint Arbitration Committee hearing"9 the union and the
drivers did not present any additional evidence. When the commit-
tee sustained the discharges, the petitioners retained counsel and
requested a rehearing. They alleged that the motel owner's state-
ment concerning the discrepancy on the motel receipts might have
been caused by a dishonest clerk who could have pocketed the dif-
ference between the amount received and the amount actually re-
corded. The request for a rehearing was denied.
Subsequently, new evidence which revealed that the motel clerk
had collected more than the price listed on the registration cards
was discovered. Petitioners thereupon initiated an action in the
Northern District Court of Ohio. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the union and the company, holding that the
decision of the Joint Arbitration Committee was final and binding
in the absence of a breach of the duty of fair representation.'" The
88. The clause read: "[tihe employer shall not discharge or suspend any employees
without just cause. ... (Art. 32, National Master Automobile Transporters Agreement).
89. Brief for Petitioners at 7.
90. Article 7 of the Central Conference Area Supplement to the National Master Automo-
bile Transporters Agreement set out this grievance procedure. If a dispute was still unsettled
after a meeting with the local union's business agent and company representative either party
could present the case to the area's joint arbitration committee. Cases which remained dead-
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court conceded that while the union may have been guilty of bad
judgment, that alone was not sufficient to prove a breach of the duty
to fairly represent the employee. Thus, the district court concluded
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a trial.9'
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed as to
the local union.92 The court concluded that there was sufficient evi-
dence of a breach of the duty of fair representation, i.e., bad faith
or arbitrary conduct. However, the court refused to set aside the
judgment in favor of the employers. This refusal was premised on
the conclusion that the finality provision of the collective bargaining
agreement applied absent evidence of employer misconduct or con-
spiracy with the local union. 3
2. No Fair Representation-No Arbitral Finality
On review before the Supreme Court, the petitioners first argued
that the Sixth Circuit and district court decisions concerning the
employer contravened the letter and spirit of Vaca v. Sipes." Vaca
stated that "a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious griev-
ance or process it in a perfunctory fashion."9" Second, the petitioners
contended that it was unjust to bind an employee to an adjudication
locked before the joint arbitration committee could be appealed to a National Joint Arbitra-
tion Committee. Only after a grievance was unresolved at this level would it be considered
by an impartial arbitrator. 424 U.S. at 557 n.2.
An amici curiae brief was filed on behalf of PROD (Professional Drivers Council for Safety
and Health) by James Banyard, a member of Local 407 whose grievance was processed by
the Teamsters Union through the hierarchy of its joint committee system, and George Kiss,
a driver for the Service Transport Company. Mr. Kiss was a union steward and handled
grievances via the joint committee system.
The amici contended that the Teamster joint labor-management grievance committee was
unworthy of judicial deference. Brief for the Amici Curiae at 7. Further they emphasized the
need for a revised judicial approach for the consideration of individual teamster's alleged
breaches of contract. They argued that "the Teamster Joint Committee system is so lacking
in procedural safeguards for individual employees that its decisions disposing of their individ-
ual grievances should not be entitled to a judicial presumption of regularity and fairness."
Brief for the Amici Curiae at 19-20. The petitioners and respondent also presented arguments
on this issue. See notes 99 and 103 and accompanying text infra. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, did not discuss the issue when they considered the case. For a discussion of the problem,
see Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663
(1973). Professor Feller supports the development of principles of law that will be applied in
courts when parties allege malfunctions of their grievance procedures. The principles of law,
he states, should conform with the norms of the grievance procedure unless it is necessary to
safeguard unprotected interests. Id. at 772-73. See note 95 infra.
91. Hines v. Teamsters, 72 CCH Lab. Cas. 13,987, p.28, 131 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
92. 506 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1974).
93. Id. at 1158. The court affirmed the judgment in the favor of the International Union,
implying that the International was not liable for the actions of the local.
94. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
95. Id. at 191. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
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of a grievance proceeding in which he was not fairly represented.9
In supporting this contention, the petitioners emphasized that relief
against the union was insufficient because they could not be
awarded reinstatement nor damages for loss of employment. 7
Third, the petitioners argued that national labor policy, which had
enhanced the collective power of employees to counteract the power
of the employer, demanded the application of Vaca to the present
case where the grievance was unfairly processed by the union. The
petitioners insisted that reversal was essential to the integrity of the
industrial grievance mechanism.9 Finally, the petitioners con-
tended that an "analysis of the relevant labor policy interests in-
volved . . . dictated reversal of the summary judgment awarded to
the employer."'' 0 The employee-petitioners emphasized that the
evidence demonstrated that they were wrongfully discharged for an
alleged dishonesty which they had denied. Further, they insisted
that the Joint Grievance Arbitration Committee proceedings' 0'
should not be accorded as great a presumption of finality as is
traditional arbitration.
Anchor answered the petitioners assertions with a six-tiered argu-
ment. First, the company argued that "contractual arbitration of
labor disputes is a part of congressional and judicial policy which
must be supported. . . unless a statutory prohibition or joint viola-
96. Brief for the Petitioners at 17, quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191. The petitioner
indicated that only the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had decided that a grievance procedure
in which an employee has been deprived of fair representation would preclude a section 301
suit against the employer. Brief for the Petitioners at 17-18. The Second, Eight and Ninth
Circuits have held otherwise. See Steinman v. Spector Freight System, Inc., 441 F.2d 599
(2nd Cir. 1971); Butler v. Local Union 823, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 514 F.2d
442 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1976); Margetta v. Pam Pam Corporation,
501 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1974). The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have indicated
in dicta that such a section 301 action against the employer would not be barred. See Bieski
v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3rd Cir. 1968); Lusk v. Eastern Products
Corp. 427 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1970); Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d
167 (5th Cir. 1971); Szczesny v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 83 L.R.R.M. 2041 (7th Cir. 1973).
97. Brief for Petitioners at 21. The Supreme Court in Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25
(1970), precluded recovery of damages for loss of employment from the union except to the
extent that it added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the employer. Id. at 29.
98. See Azoff, Joint Committees as an Alternative Form of Arbitration Under the NLRA,
47 TUL. L. REv. 325 (1973) for a discussion of abuses of power by unions. See also Report of
Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., 105 CONG. REc. 6281 (1959).
99. Brief for Petitioner at 25. They argued that if the Steelworkers Trilogy doctrine of
reliance on contractual grievance proceedings as the primary means of resolving industrial
disputes was to be preserved, the Court must reverse the Sixth Circuit.
100. Brief for the Petitioners at 28.
101. Id. at 32. See note 88 supra.
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tions of law or contract dictate otherwise.' 1 ,2 Second, the company
argued that unfair representation is exclusively a union duty and
not dependent on employer conduct. 03 Third, the company con-
tended that they were vindicated contractually, administratively
and judicially, thus barring the petitioners' action. Fourth, the com-
pany argued that judicial tribunals should not review the merits of
arbitration decisions where a failure to represent an employee does
not affect the fairness of the arbitration proceeding. Fifth, the com-
pany insisted that a recantation by a witness after an arbitral award
should not abrogate the arbitration award. 04 Finally, the company
contended that the same degree of finality should be accorded the
Joint Grievance Arbitration Committee as is accorded any other
method of arbitration." 5
After reviewing prior Supreme Court cases dealing with fair repre-
sentation and arbitral finality issues, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally rejected the company's contention that the employer "must be
protected from relitigation by the express contractual provision de-
claring a decision to be final and binding."'0 ' The Court stated that
a breach of the duty of fair representation overrides the requirement
that labor relation disputes be resolved via the grievance mecha-
nism. Expressing concern over the effectiveness of the arbitration
mechanism, the Court declared that a breach of fair representation
by the union will remove the "bar of finality" if it seriously under-
mines the integrity of the arbitral process. °7
The Supreme Court discussed whether the arbitral finality provi-
sion could be set aside by employees who assert that the grievance
102. Brief for the Respondents at 10.
103. Id. at 20.
104. Id. at 28. The company cited several cases for the proposition that newly discovered
evidence "should not cause an arbitration award to be upset. See Washington-Baltimore
Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. The Washington Post Company, 442 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Bridgeport Boiling Mills Co. v. Brown, 314 F.2d 885 (2nd Cir. 1963). Kirschner v. West
Company, 247 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1965), was also cited by the company. In this case the
court cited language from Karppinen v. Karl Keifer Mach. Co., 187 F.2d 32, 35, (2nd Cir.
1951) that held that "since it necessarily raises issues of credibility which have already been
before the arbitrators once, the party relying on it must first show that he could not have
discovered it during the arbitration." 247 F. Supp. at 553.
The Anchor Motor Freight case, however, is not similar to the Kirschner case because the
employers could not disprove the witness' veracity as the union, for all practical purposes,
prevented such an investigation. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
105. Brief for the Respondents at 31. See note 88 supra.
106. 424 U.S. at 570. The majority consisted of Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, Stew-
art, and Blackmum. Mr. Justice Stewart agreed that proof of breach of the duty of fair
representation would remove the bar of finality, but would not award back pay to the employ-
ees.
107. Id.
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process has malfunctioned because of a bad faith performance of the
union. The Court disagreed with the employer's contention that the
company was faultless. It was the company, the Court indicated,
that originated the discharges for alleged dishonesty. Whereas the
Sixth Circuit would not upset the arbitral finality provision absent
employer implication in the union's malfeasance, the Supreme
Court did not view actual employer misconduct or conspiracy with
the union as determinative. The fact that the employer had precipi-
tated the dispute by discharging the petitioners was enough for the
Court to set aside the arbitral finality provision. The Court stated:
[W]e cannot believe that Congress intended to foreclose the em-
ployee from his §301 remedy otherwise available against the em-
ployer if the contractual processes have been seriously flawed by
the union's breach of its duty to represent employees honestly and
in good faith and without invidious discrimination or arbitrary
conduct.'"'
Further, the Court did not believe that its holding would under-
mine the collective bargaining process. The majority emphasized
that they did not intend to fashion a requirement that the grievance
mechanism be error free. Thus, under the Court's holding in Anchor
Motor Freight, an employee does not (ostensibly) have a right to
relitigate his discharge merely because of recently discovered evi-
dence or errors in judgment. Something more is required. Just what
the boundaries are, and what is and is not a breach of the duty of
fair representation, however, remains unsettled. The Court stated:
[[In our view, enforcement of the finality provision where the
arbitrator has erred is conditioned upon the union's having satis-
fied its statutory duty fairly to represent the employee in connec-
tion with the arbitration proceeding. . . .[I]t makes little differ-
ence whether the union subverts the arbitration process by refusing
to proceed as in Vaca, or follows the arbitration trail to the end,
but in doing so subverts the arbitration by failing to fairly repre-
sent the employee. In neither case, does the employee receive fair
representation."l9
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist insisted that while the
Court's holding in Vaca would encourage labor and management to
pursue arbitration, Anchor Motor Freight would produce the oppo-
site effect. He believed that the majority ignored the policy of fi-
nality of arbitration and "established a new policy of encouraging
108. Id. at 574.
109. Id. at 575.
[Vol. 9
Fate of Arbitration
challenges to arbitration decrees by the losing party on the ground
that he was not properly represented." ' ' 0 Justice Rehnquist chal-
lenged the majority's assertion that, there was no difference in
whether a union had "refused to proceed as in Vaca" or had negli-
gently proceeded with the "arbitration trail to the end."", He
viewed the existence of a final arbitration award as a "crucial dif-
ference" between Anchor Motor Freight and Vaca. He expressly
rejected the notion that "one may vacate an otherwise valid arbi-
tration award because his 'counsel' was ineffective.""
' '2
Beyond Anchor Motor Freight
Anchor Motor Freight's substantial impact on the arbitral mecha-
nism is unquestionable; the scope of the holding, however, is un-
clear. One commentator suggests that the decision in Anchor Motor
Freight can be narrowly restricted to cases in which there was a
preliminary grievance procedure involving an area-wide joint arbi-
tration committee."3 This view accords with Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion which viewed the majority decision as being
widely applicable to situations in which an impartial, neutral arbi-
trator renders a "final arbitratn decision."
Until the Supreme Court clarifies its holding in Anchor Motor
Freight, any conclusion about its scope is purely speculative. The
Supreme Court did not address the issue of according a lesser or
higher standard of finality to area joint arbitration committees,
although both sides argued that point in their briefs. The majority
in Anchor Motor Freight did not distinguish the case in which a final
decision had been rendered by an impartial arbitrator from the
situation where there was an intermediate decision rendered by an
area joint arbitration committee. Contrarily, the language em-
ployed by the majority impels one to believe that the holding was
intended to be given a broad interpretation.'
The question remains, however, whether Justice Rehnquist's
warning that Anchor Motor Freight will defeat the foundations of
the collective bargaining process, i.e., arbitral finality, will ulti-
mately prove prophetic. Perhaps Justice Rehnquist can take com-
110. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 575.
112. Id.
113. Coulson, Vaca v. Sipes' Illegitimate Child: The Impact of Anchor Motor Freight on
the Finality Doctrine in Grievance Arbitration, 10 GEO. L. REV. 693 (1976).
114. The majority stated that "enforcement of the finality provision where the arbitrator
has erred is conditioned on the union's having satisfied its statutory duty fairly to represent
the employees. ... 424 U.S. at 571.
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fort in the majority's indication that the duty of fair representation
in Anchor Motor Freight does not create a blanket right of an em-
ployee to overturn an arbitration award solely because of new evi-
dence or union misjudgment. Further, he may look upon the major-
ity's words in a more favorable light if Anchor Motor Freight results
in more careful preparation of arbitration cases. Thus, Justice
Rehnquist's generalization of the facts which in effect place the two
forms of arbitration in the same basket may prove unjustified by
subsequent applications of the Anchor Motor Freight case."'
CONCLUSION
In Buffalo Forge, the 1975-76 Supreme Court held that notwith-
standing a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement,
federal courts do not have the power to enjoin sympathy strikes. The
analytical methodology utilized by the Court was an equitable ac-
commodation of the two philosophies of our national labor pol-
icy-private settlement of labor disputes by means of arbitration
and court intervention. The Court effectively held that arbitration
was the most appropriate vehicle for the resolution of the conflict
and would promote an expeditious settlement of the industrial dis-
pute.
The Buffalo Forge Court, concerned about the preservation of the
viability and utility of the arbitration process, therefore decided
that an injunction could not be used to enjoin a sympathy strike.
By so holding, the Court reasserted its proclamation in the
Steelworkers Trilogy that arbitration is the preferred mechanism for
settlement of labor relation disputes. While employers may be
tempted to press for non-removal clauses in collective bargaining
agreements in order to circumvent the jurisdiction of federal courts
and avoid the effect of Buffalo Forge, such a tactic would only serve
to undermine our national labor policy.
In the 1975-76 term the Court also decided Anchor Motor Freight.
The Court held that notwithstanding the policy of arbitral finality,
it was not proper to dismiss a discharged employee's suit against his
former employer if the employee could demonstrate: (1) erroneous
discharge; and, (2) breach of the union's duty of fair representation
during the grievance arbitration process."'
The Anchor Motor Freight Court expressed concern about main-
taining the integrity of the collective bargaining process. Although
it recognized the longstanding fundamental principle of arbitral fi-
115. See notes 101 and 105 supra.
116. 424 U.S. at 570-71.
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nality, the Court concluded that it should not be invoked when it
would undermine the requirement of fair representation.
Both Buffalo Forge and Anchor Motor Freight represent attempts
by the Supreme Court to further define the arbitration process.
Buffalo Forge will more than likely compel employers to pursue
arbitration rather than run the risk of intensified judicial involve-
ment in labor relations. Similarly, Anchor Motor Freight should
stimulate an examination and improvement of current grievance-
arbitration mechanisms in order to afford greater safeguards for
grievants. 7 The cumulative effect should strengthen the grievance-
arbitration process.
117. See note 98 supra.

